|1||When a State or Government renounces or loses sovereignty over a territory, chaos is bound to occur, unless or until another sovereignty is established, be it through an existing State or by establishing an new State. When the British sovereign decided to withdraw from Cyprus in 1958/1959 as a consequence of a permanent and violent Greek Cypriot revolt involving also strife between the Greek and Turkish communities, chaos was imminent. In order to avoid it, a new state or new states and governments were to be established in Cyprus. The question whether or not or how this was or was to be or is still to be achieved, indicates the essence of the version and phase of the Cyrus problem that began with the British decision (1). While the correct answer to that question refutes the tale of its high complexity, this problem persists until this very day, because the answer (to be indicated below) was and still is set aside by the majority of the overwhelming powers involved. This problem became the context of the professional and private life of Dr. h.c. Mehmet Necati Münir Ertekün, who is to be commemorated in this article. The article may also serve to revive the memory of the development of the Cyprus conflict from its very beginning.|
|2||A reliable answer to chaos and strife capable of providing permanent peace within a territory and in the international relations of its population can only be found on the basis of the traditional and internationally accepted definition of the notion of State. It derives from sovereignty in the meaning of permanent supreme power maintaining a legal order for, and superior to all other powers effective within, this territory (2). Despite all recent breath-taking virtual developments of international law (3) and international organisations, this institution of a State meeting the criteria mentioned, remains the ultimate and the only reliable guarantor for peace. In international practice and international law teaching, however, its definition is subject to a dispute concerning the meaning of fact or recognition or legitimacy or even legality as constitutive elements of sovereignty and, therefore, of the legal notion and existence in law of a State (4).|
|3||The British decision to give up Cyprus provided an eventual and late answer to an ages-old Greek nationalistic policy in the context of European nationalistic movements and insurrections throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the likewise nationalistic Turkish reaction. Greek nationalism, that had already formed one of the causes for the Anatolian tragedy of the third decade of the 20h century, reached a belated peak in Cyprus during and soon after the Second World War. It brought forth the claim that Cyprus was Greek in its natural substance, relying also on the example of the history of Crete. Unification with Greece (Enosis) was the parole spread in the Greek community of Cyprus to voice this claim (5). But Enosis was not really (and proved later until this day not to be) an essential ingredient of that claim. It was and is more basically directed at unlimited Greek-Cypriot command over Cyprus, invoking the ideal of self-determination. As concerns self-determination and self-rule in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots were not considered part of that self by the Greek Cypriot movement, but felt entitled to self-determination and self-rule of their own.|
|4||Greek-Cypriot Colonel George Grivas (Dighenis 1897-1974) of the army of mainland Greece, an expert in partisan fighting and out of work after victory had been won over communism in post-war Greece, found a new job invading Cyprus in November, 1954. He founded and organized very effectively the movement for Enosis under the name of EOKA, designed from the beginning to pursue that goal by means of violence. EOKA was a sworn fraternity of patriotic Greek Cypriots and particularly of young Hellenists ready to stage their lives in an all-out terroristic effort to oust Britons from the island. Between 1955 and 1958 grave civil strife ensued. Britain sent troops to Cyprus in considerable strength to quench the fire. The ambition of Greek rule over the Turkish Cypriots based on the contention that Cyprus was Greek, led to the latter siding up to a certain point - with the English government against the Greek Cypriot uprising, and to the Turkish Cypriots calling for partition of the island into a Turkish-Cypriot and a Greek-Cypriot territory. EOKA extended its assaults to the Turkish Cypriots, and the latter reacted by forming a fighter organization of their own called Volkan, later replaced by TMT, that counter-acted in a similar way (6). Becoming victims of the strife, many Turkish and Greek Cypriots and English civilians and soldiers lost their lives, their health or their belongings.|
|5||Shortly after the Second World War, in 1946, Mehmet Necati Münir, as was his name at the time, had graduated with triple first class honours from his studies of law in Cambridge University. He started out as a Law Officer in the British government of Tanganyika. In 1953, on the eve of the events mentioned before, he returned to Cyprus. M.N. Münir followed in the footsteps of the elder generations of his family, who had held important public positions in the island, when he was promoted to become Solicitor-General and Deputy Attorney General in Cyprus. He hurried to fulfil the duties of that position, which became difficult enough during the period of inter-communal competition and strife. From then on, he employed his professional capacity and, indeed, his whole personality and energy in helping the Turkish Cypriots in their efforts to secure their identity, self government, safety and equal stance in a peaceful solution of what soon began to be internationally perceived as the Cyprus problem. These objectives became the predominant subject-matter of the rest of his then still young life. For his service in the British government he was awarded with the Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1957.|
|6||From the beginning of his engagement in Cyprus, his high sense for justice and impartiality, his honesty, his warm personal kindness and charm, together with the intensity of his engagement enabled Necati Münir to deal with utmost possible results with the problems confronting the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Among the first of his tasks concerning these problems was that of developing legislature necessary for the temporary banning of Archbishop Makarios III (Michail Christodoulos Mouskos, 1913-1977), the acclaimed and powerful political leader of the Greek Cypriot movement for insurgence and secession, to the Seychelles islands during 1956-1959, that had been decreed by the British government. By discharging this duty, Münir was obliged to step in place of the Greek-Cypriot Attorney General, who had wisely been made absent from the island for the purpose. This was, in the face of armed Greek-Cypriot underground terrorism, one of the most demanding tasks available in Cyprus at the time. It made N.M. Münir subject to threats and assaults from the Greek side.|
|7||To the attempt initiated by the British government, and joined by Greece and Turkey as well as by the two Cypriot communities, at finding a permanent setup for cohabitation in Cyprus following the British withdrawal (7), N.M. Münir contributed greatly in deliberating, negotiating, drafting, and putting into effect the Treaties and Constitution that were formally accepted by the five parties mentioned in 1959/1960 (8). He gave up a promising career in the British service to become one of the three judges of the Constitutional Court established in 1960 under Art. 133 of that Constitution. Together with his colleague and Greek-Cypriot counterpart Michalakis Triantafyllides, he introduced the President of the Court, the German Professor Ernst Forsthoff (1902-1974) of Heidelberg University, to his office. During the following three optimistic years, N.M. Münir dedicated himself to the settlement of disputes through many well received judgments given unanimously by the Constitutional Court and documented in six volumes of case-reports (9). While these judgments could not prevent the collapse of the phantom Republic of Cyprus of 1960, they helped, little more than three years after its purported establishment, in establishing in Cyprus an albeit rudimentary - system of administrative law as prevailed in most European countries as one of the results of the enlightenment of the late 18th century and suggested also by the new Constitution of Cyprus (10).|
|8||It was late in 1962 that I made the acquaintance of Constitutional Judge Necati Münir when I came to Cyprus as a young lawyer on leave from my position in a Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany in order to serve in the Constitutional Court of Cyprus as assistant to its president, who had been my teacher in public law. I was struck immediately by the great and warm civility, modesty and high competence emanating from N.M. Münirs personality, as distinguished from the likewise high ability but obviously predominant ambition of his Greek Cypriot counterpart J. Triantafyllides. Towards the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, after many incidents following the coming into operation of the arrangements of 1960 had accumulated a growing awareness of the Greek intention of abolishing the essence of the treaties and Constitution of 1960, namely the elements of Turkish-Cypriot co-determination on all levels of government and the right of guarantee of the status quo in Cyprus stipulated for mainland Turkey in those treaties. The leading representative of the Greek-Cypriot community and Greek policy vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem was the charismatic and politically potent Archbishop Makarios, who enjoyed with the help of his clergy almost unlimited authority over that community. In these capacities, Makarios had publicly stated, before and right after having assumed the office of president of the Republic, that the Greek side did not really want, or even agree to, the treaties or constitution of 1960 but considered them as no more than a stepping stone on their way to full command over the island (11). These incidents and declarations were not, however, outside the circles interested in or conforming with the Greek policy, taken seriously without or even within Cyprus, but slyly described or negligently considered as inevitable friction accompanying a development to the full implementation of those treaties and constitution.|
|9||However, this view proved a fatal error by those who were not aware of the reality or feasibility of Greek planning and policy designed at getting rid of constitutional and treaty rules that constituted the position of the Turkish Cypriots as partners in the government of the island at all its levels as enshrined in the Constitution and Treaties of 1960. As this position was the most important political feature and objective of the treaties and constitution of 1960, this policy amounted to an undertaking directed at the destruction of the arrangement constituted by these instruments (12). In order to achieve this, practically the whole of the Greek Cypriot leadership, most of whom held high offices in the new Republic, had developed and sworn to what was to become known as the revolutionary Akritas Plan designed to organize the steps to be taken including the application of the force of arms against Turkish resistance (13).|
|10||Certainly not the most important or most difficult subject-matter of Greek-Cypriot aspiration at reducing Turkish rights was that of the so-called Municipalities Case, that had come before the Constitutional Court of Cyprus in 1962. But this dispute triggered the end of constitutional jurisprudence in the Republic of Cyprus, and, thereby, the end of that experimental Republic itself. It also triggered the coming into operation of the Akritas plan. The dispute had arisen from the Turkish-Cypriot interest in separate Turkish administrations in the largest Cities of Cyprus. These interests were protected by Article 173 of the Cyprus Constitution of 1960. Its section 1 provides that separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of the Republic, that is to say Nicosia, Limasol, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Paphos by the Turkish inhabitants thereof (14). In January, 1963, the Greek Cypriot dominated organs took diverse actions aimed at bringing under their exclusive control the administration of the towns mentioned. By its Greek Cypriot majority the council of Ministers purported in January, 1963, to create improvement areas for and to appoint improvement boards in respect of the towns mentioned. These regulations would have excluded the Turkish inhabitants and the Turkish Communal chamber from their administration. Upon an application from the relevant Turkish Cypriot organs, the Constitutional Court ruled on 25th April, 1963, that the action taken by the Council of Ministers was void ab initio and without legal effect, because the organization of the administration of the said towns envisaged by it contradicted the guarantee of separate municipalities as provided in Art. 173 of the Constitution of 1960 (15). The argument raised by the Greek side in discussing the issue that separate municipalities were unworkable is refuted by the fact that such municipalities had functioned ever since CAP 240, a law by the British government of Cyprus, had been made and continued functioning until it came out of operation on 31st December, 1962 (16).|
|11||As tension between the Greek and Turkish Communities had been growing over the municipalities case and over the emerging readiness of the Greek party to realize its policy of bringing Cyprus under its unlimited rule, the Greek efforts to win their case or at least obstruct Court rulings to the opposite effect culminated when the judgment in the municipalities case was to be finalized in April, 1962. As it had leaked out that, due to the decisive vote of the Courts president, it would amount to a declaration of the Court by majority to the effect that the Greek municipality legislation was incompatible with Art. 173 of the Constitution, the Greek policy went so far as to refuse the cooperation of the Greek Cypriot Judge and the Greek staff of the Court in drawing up, typing and copying the English text of the judgment. In this situation the functioning of the Court depended particularly on the help rendered by N.M. Münir J.|
|12||When the decision of the Constitutional Court, made by majority of its President and J. Münir, to uphold the guarantee of separate municipalities became known, president Makarios and his minister of justice declared, that the Greek part of the government was determined to disobey any respective judgment made or to be made by the Court. This declaration of spring 1963 marked the factual and legal failure and end of the experimental Republic of Cyprus purported to have been founded in 1960. The President of the Constitutional Court resigned and its function collapsed. The announcement of a suggestion to change the Constitution by comprehensively abolishing all its rules designed to secure participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the legislature, the executive and judiciary powers of Cyprus, merely helped to ascertain what had already been achieved by getting rid of constitutional jurisdiction as far as its task consisted in securing the Turkish Cypriot participation mentioned. Naming the objective of the declaration of December 1963 a change of the Constitution was and is nothing but a deception obscuring its meaning of a complete denunciation of the binding force of the very core and basis of the arrangement comprising the Constitution and Treaties of 1960. It was an additional and very blunt deception to call the 13 points of Makarios a suggestion because they were in truth a description of the state of affairs already created by the declaration of non-adherence mentioned, by revealing the non-adherence to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and by the determination to act according to the Akritas plan as soon as possible. With this departure from the legal setup of 1960, the leaders of the Greek Cypriots drew the consequences of their often declared resolution not to be bound by those Treaties and that Constitution. Even if, in spite of the reservations mentioned, a Republic of Cyprus had at all come into existence legally in 1960 (17), then the declaration of disobedience to the Constitutional Court and the announcement of December 1960 together with the following violent assaults would amount to a revolutionary process. The true meaning of this process became clear beyond any doubt, when the Greek Cypriots went on, from December 1963 onwards, to reduce by the application of physical force Turkish Cypriots to be objects of their discretion and to establish in fact a Cyprus Republic of their own by purportedly removing, from the Laws in force in Cyprus until 1963 including the Constitution of 1960, the clauses designed to safeguard the right of the Turkish Cypriots to participate in a government of Cyprus (18).|
|13||In December 1963 and early in 1964, organized Greek civilian members or followers of EOKA, who had not been able to exercise their destructive occupation since a cease-fire of 1959 but who had retained their arms or who had been furnished with new arms through the channels of EOKA, appeared in all Turkish-Cypriot quarters exhibiting their weapons and in many cases using them wherever Turkish Cypriots lived, in order to intimidate them to give up their resistance against Greek domination (19). The employment of Greek Cypriot superior regular or irregular armed forces in the island, that were later enforced by volunteers from mainland Greece (20), to cover the Greek Cypriot revolution against the Constitution of 1960, deprived the Turkish Cypriots of all safeguards against Greek discrimination, persecution and abuse. Far from surrendering their rights, however, the Turkish Cypriots concentrated in several areas where they were able to secure their very basic physical safety by defending themselves against Greek terrorism, usurpation, and domination and to establish rudimentary self-administration. The exodus of about 25,000 Turkish Cypriots took place between December, 1963, and August, 1964 (21). For their enhanced safety, the Turkish Cypriots paid the price of being cut off from supplies needed for even most primitive survival and reduced to life in ghettoes (22). The Greek assault did not encounter any interference from but was even supported by the Greek Cypriot part of the government. It amounted, for those who had to leave their homes, to another wave after 1955/59 of turning Turkish Cypriots into refugees in their own homeland, and to an expulsion of the same nature if only, as far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned, of lesser size than that which was to take place in 1974. For years to come, Turkish Cypriots were unable to leave their areas and Greek Cypriots were unable to enter them without being escorted by UN armed personnel. Moreover, the Greek side imposed an embargo on these territories, preventing them to deal with the outside (23).|
|14||The Greek-Cypriots, who had held offices in the former experimental Republic including its Courts of law, began to conduct themselves in the island and internationally as representatives of such a Republic. The Greek organs refused to accept the participation of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President of the purported republic. They denied the Turkish Cypriots who had been elected as members of a Cypriot parliament access to its meetings (24). While common Greek-and-Turkish-Cypriot Courts of law had continued to operate, albeit defectively, after 1963/64, Greek Cypriot police proceeded in 1966 to make access of Turkish Cypriot judges to these Courts, and indeed their leaving the Turkish controlled territory, dependent on their submitting to bodily searching (25), thus preventing them from exercising their offices in a decent way. To bring the Cyprus problem to a final solution, the Greek members of the former Cypriot parliament passed laws from 1964 onwards, usurping the title of laws of a Republic of Cyprus and purporting to abrogate formally what they had already forcibly put out of effect. All these Greek actions must be regarded, even if the Republic of Cyprus purported to have been created in 1960 had come into existence or still existed in 1965, as contravening basic parts of the Constitution of 1960 and being therefore without legal effect whatsoever. The actions amounted to the creation of a new Greek Republic (26) confined to the parts of Cyprus outside the Turkish-Cypriot controlled territory, to which Greek power did not extend. However, the revolutionary meaning of the Greek action remained almost unnoticed internationally, in part due to mainland Turkish government hesitating to give wide or strong international publicity to an evaluation of the developments described and particularly to the destruction of constitutional jurisprudence in April, 1963, probably because it had itself underestimated their legal meaning or the importance of that meaning (27). From 1963 onwards the Greek Cypriot usurpers were able to proceed without being confronted with many international doubts regarding their status except for the reservations made by Turkey. As Turkey threatened, in 1964, to make use of its right of guarantee stipulated in the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (28), a Turkish military intervention was prevented by an intervention of the US government (29). The USA as the most powerful party involved in the Cyprus conflict since the British withdrawal, had decided to take the side of the Greek conflicting party. It is therefore not surprising that the powers obliged to guarantee the status quo in Cyprus, namely Britain and Greece (30), not to speak of other governments of the world, facilitated the Greek Cypriot policy of simulating the continued existence of a Republic of Cyprus and of bringing it under its exclusive control. The international community of nations ignored the Greek breach of the treaties covering the Cyprus problem and the events described and accepted the Greek-Cypriot administration as the government of all Cyprus, disregarding all points of constitutional and international law indicating the illegality of an extension of its revolutionary power to the Turkish territory. The British government showed no sign of even considering the use of their right of intervention for the purpose of restoring the status created in 1960. The contribution made, more to the Cyprus conflict than to its solution, by the rest of the family of nations and their organizations, namely, the United Nations Organization and, later on, the European Union, resulted in supporting the Greek Cypriot policy of usurpation. This left the Turkish Cypriot community void of any adequate legal status or factual power outside their areas, but required it to negotiate a settlement with the Greek Cypriot party considered as the sole holder of legitimate authority in and over Cyprus.|
|15||Thus, the Greek deceptions mentioned above about the foundation of a Republic of Cyprus in 1960 or about suggestions to change its Constitution were successful in that most foreign governments, the United Nations Organisation and the European Union accepted the tale of a (continued) existence of a Cyprus Republic of 1960 and the identity of the Greek State created in Cyprus in 1963/64 with that Republic and its intended territory: the whole island. This international policy became the cause and explains all basic political developments in and about Cyprus since 1964, namely, inter alia, the ghettoisation of the Turkish Cypriots and the embargo imposed on them (31) as well as the denial of a Turkish right to the intervention that took place in 1974, and it also explains the failure of all mediation ideas and efforts developed an applied after 1964, and, thereby, the continuation of the Cyprus problem, until this very day.|
|16||The events of 1963/64 marked the beginning of decades of all degrees of suffering for the Turkish Cypriots, ranging from a latent threat for life and liberty to the hardships and encroachments deriving from the international embargo based on a purported authority of the Greek Cypriot community over the Turkish Cypriots. This period covered in fact the other half of the professional lifetime of Necati Münir and still continued when he died. It is obvious that the developments described above raised many difficult legal questions. N. Münir engaged himself in prominent positions in the continuing struggle of the Turkish Cypriots for freedom, self-rule, and justice including the removal of the choking measures adopted since 1964 by the Greek conflicting party with the help of the rest of the world and designed to impede the political, social, economic and even physical survival of the Turkish Cypriots. N. Münir has, after the breakdown of the Constitutional Court, assumed positions in the still functioning common Courts of law until they were destroyed by the Greek Cypriot policy (32). From then on, it became the calling of N. Münir to contribute to the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community in various positions as a high judge in Turkish-Cypriot Courts of law and as an advisor, often under insufficient and less than provisional conditions. He participated in and helped to prepare the negotiations ensuing from 1964 onwards under the guidance of the United Nations Organization and under pressure from the USA and from the European and other governments that followed their path. He advised the Turkish-Cypriot leadership headed by Rauf Denktas mainly in legal and diplomatic matters.|
|17||It was obvious from the beginning that the importance of these negotiations of partners quite unequal in status, resources, power and international support would be restricted to cover up the Greek-Cypriot policy of waiting until conditions in the Turkish Cypriot areas and the subsequent frustration of the Turkish Cypriots would force this community to submit to the state of affairs created by the Greek-Cypriot revolution of 1963/1964 but hitherto effective in the South of the island only. Therefore, the work of N. Münir was doomed to hardship. After a decade of Turkish patience had passed by since 1964, however, Turkey had succeed in changing the attitude of the USA applied in 1965 to one that would enable it to intervene in Cyprus in order to restore at least the fundaments of the status agreed upon in 1960.|
|18||This intervention took place in July, 1974 when an invasion of forces from mainland Greece under the command of the military dictatorship in power there with the objective of incorporating Cyprus into the Greek republic provided a political opportunity for Turkish action. The Turkish army landed in Cyprus, and established a line of defence against Greek usurpation between the North and the South of the island, enabling the Turkish Cypriots to move to the North where they could, for the first time since 1963, live free of Greek terrorism or oppression, governing themselves and realizing their basic rights. However, most governments of the world continued to let themselves be deceived by the outcry of the Greek side against an aggressive invasion that was to distract from the real position and correct evaluation. It was argued that the establishment of a Turkish-Cypriot government over a northern part of the island was not covered by the right of guarantee being restricted to the purpose of re-establishing the status introduced by the Cyprus treaties and constitution of 1960. It is true that the consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot territory caused by the Turkish armed action of 1974 was equivalent to an expulsion of the Greek Cypriots whose home had been in the north while they were officially encouraged to stay (which some did without being harmed), because of their absolute opposition to the idea of living with a Turkish majority. This result must be regarded, however, as the consequence of the previous expulsion of Turkish Cypriots from their homes and their reduction to the Turkish controlled areas mentioned including their deprivation of normal living conditions and basic rights. While this hardship had been reduced to a lesser degree from 1967 onwards (33) it had continued in its basic substance during the coming years. It reverted to fully fledged Greek terrorism during many months after the Turkish armed action, when Turkish Cypriots were driven from their homes in the Greek controlled southern part of the island, concentrated in prison-camps, beaten, killed, robbed and pursued everywhere so that they became obliged to withdraw to the north of the defence line mentioned.|
|19||It is also true that it was impossible not only in the prevailing circumstances but in any conceivable case fore any guarantor to restore immediately and completely the state of affairs of Cyprus referred to in the Treaty of guarantee as far as the objective of this treaty was to uphold cooperation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in ruling themselves. But where two different communities cannot live together peacefully in the same territory because of one of them striving for domination over the other and the latter determined not to suffer domination, both to a degree that they would rather take to violence than find a compromise, cooperation cannot be forced on them. But the idea of cooperation is not conceivable without and relies on the deeper objective of granting the people concerned a government that would protect equally their life, liberty, property and security. Realizing this basic objective as an essential foundation of the Treaties and Constitution of 1960 must result in an interpretation of the right of guarantee to the effect that, where cooperation cannot be enforced, it remains the more basic objective of the stipulated guarantee at least to establish the government to which the Turkish Cypriots are entitled and which the Greek Cypriot leadership did not constitute because it not only made no effort of protecting the rights and security of the Turkish Cypriots but helped in their destruction. If common self rule could not be enforced, it remained the objective of the guarantee stipulated to establish self rule for all Cypriots. Under the prevailing circumstances of Cyprus, this is possible only by separating the two communities in different territories. The protection of basic human rights must prevail over the secondary Treaty provision designed to exclude partition of Cyprus, on which President Johnson had relied in his letter mentioned above. As concerns the more distant future, the resulting equality of status and position of both communities of Cyprus provides an essential condition for their reconciliation, because it makes cooperation dependent not on outward pressure but on sincere cooperation in the freely and fully recognized true interest of both communities. Agreements concluded under such circumstances have a far greater chance of being observed as long as interests match than any normative imposition. The viable guarantee described implies these conditions by creating of a situation that meets the traditional criteria of statehood, namely, the institution of a sovereign power over a defined territory.|
|20||The Turkish Intervention of 1974 and onwards brought to Cyprus not only peace in the sense of absence of violence or even of the absence of the danger of an application of force in the relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus. It also brought to both communities of Cyprus unhampered self-government (34). This peace was and still is, however, until this day, incomplete in one albeit essential respect: The embargo on the Turkish Cypriot community continues and is being reinforced through almost all governments of the world with the exception of Turkey denying recognition to the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC).|
|21||Moreover, the European Union, by simply designating without legal or factual justification the Greek State of the south as comprising all Cyprus and accepting accession of that State to the Union as of 15th April, 2004 (35), incorporated the northern territory of Cyprus that had never belonged to any of its member states. The world at large failed to appreciate the service that was rendered to peace and to the binding meaning of the international treaties of 1960 by Turkey sacrificing the lives of many of her soldiers in 1974 in fighting Greek-Cypriot deception, usurpation and terrorism. The world denied instead international status and normal commercial and communicative exchange to a community that had formed part of the population of the island since 400 years but had become, from 1955 onwards, the victims of violent and intolerant treatment by their Greek cohabitants in Cyprus. The first steps taken in the direction of Turkish self-government after the overthrow of the Constitution of 1960 had been taken in the Turkish controlled areas mentioned above from 1964 onwards (36). On 13th February 1975 the consolidated organization of the Turkish Cypriot community named itself Federated State of North Cyprus, thus offering the Greek-Cypriots an improvement of the arrangement of 1960 (37). When this offer remained without Greek echo, the Turkish State turned, on 15th November, 1983, into the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and gave itself a constitution that is still in force today. Not the Turkish intervention, which deserves the title of a peace-operation, but the non-recognition of the facts and incorrect evaluations blocked the way to ending the Cyprus conflict and caused instead an enlargement of the scope of legal and diplomatic demands facing the Turkish Cypriots. Dealing with these demands involved a great amount of constructive legal and diplomatic work, a large part of which fell on the shoulders of N.M. Münir.|
|22||From 1974 onwards, the Greek-sponsored and internationally enforced embargo against the Turkish Cypriots was extended to the territory that had come under Turkish Cypriot control. Negotiations directed at reverting history were forced upon the Greek and Turkish Cypriots by the international community. They took place in several rounds of Vienna talks between 1975 and 1977 and in intercommunal talks between 1979 and 1983 (38). They resulted in several joint declarations, for example: the Geneva Declaration of 30th July 1974, the Exchange of Populations Agreement of 2nd August, 1975, the Four Guidelines of 12th February, 1977, and the Ten-Points-Agreement of 19th May, 1979 (39). As concerns the basic substance of the Cyprus conflict, however, these negotiations were doomed to failure as long as the Greek Cypriots insisted on a solution that would enable them to continue the pursuit of their unchanging goal of dominating Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots therein and ruling out a role of Turkey as an effective guarantor. Any such solution was and remains to be unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots, as it would expose them once more to the mercy of the Greek Cypriot community that, until this day, displays condescension, hatred, and oppression as their fundamental attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots. N.M. Münir lived to witness the birth of the so called Annan plan for reunification of Cyprus prepared in the UN-Offices by compiling and supplementing partial results of negotiations between the two communities to which Ertekün had prominently contributed. The plan was not viable, first of all because it did not delimitate the Turkish and Greek Cypriot zones nor did it resolve the question of guarantees, and because its clauses were much more complicated and in need of interpretation than the Constitution of 1960 (49). Although it gave the Greek Cypriots a chance of reaching their goal of dominating Cyprus by using their experienced legal and political trick-box, the plan was accepted by majority of the frustrated and embargoed Turkish and rejected by majority of the Greek Cypriots in 2003. The outcome made it clear that the Greek Cypriots preferred to cling to the utopia of a Greek Cyprus to a sort of unification allowing co-determination of Turkish Cypriots. But while the family of nations, by submitting the plan for voting to both communities, had recognized both their right of determining their political organization including the formation of a state, the logical consequence of recognizing TRNC was still not drawn. As a result, the communities were pressurized to start negotiations over again. The world is still watching, but some European and national organs are pulling the rope tighter around the neck of the Turkish Cypriots. Gods mercy delivered Necati Münir Ertekün from the obligation of taking notice of the outcome of the Orams Case in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and in the British Court of Appeal (41). On the other hand, Münir Ertekün did not live to enjoy the glimpse of hope for the Turkish cause in Cyprus contained in the Decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 1st March 2010 ruling out exaggerated claims based on a human right to property purported to have been violated by the establishment of TRNC, this judgment giving due consideration to the impact of political development and the lapse of time on such rights (42).|
|23||In the distress of his people that found itself in a position similar to that of David in his struggle against Goliath, Necati Münir Ertekün, who certainly had other opportunities, did not hesitate, at an early stage of his professional life, to place it and all his energy at the disposal of that community and the emerging Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. Both took complete advantage of his labour. Ertekün was described by President Rauf Denktas as his most important advisor. This title is highly meaningful for those aware of the diplomatic and legal capacity of the charismatic President Denktas himself. The scope of the efforts in which Ertekün has participated derives even from the incomplete and only indicative examples given in this article. His learned capacity and diplomatic, enhanced by endless patience and constancy, was of high advantage for the Turkish cause and was appreciated equally by the leadership of his people as also by the government of Turkey. It was also recognized internationally and even by leading personalities of the opposite side of the Cyprus conflict.|
|24||Mehmet Münir Ertekün, as he was now named, became the author of the book The Cyprus Dispute of 1981 (2nd edition 1984), covering the main legal and political topics of the Cyprus Conflict until 1983 (43), as well as of other publications, among these the book Intercommunal Talks and the Cyprus Problem, Observations on U.N. General Assembly (44). His works give testimony of the enormous scope and difficulty of the problems with which he was obliged to deal. Those who have studied some of the innumerable books and articles published world-wide on the Cyprus conflict and of the dozens of legal instruments some of which were drafted by highest authorities to end this conflict will agree that the legal and political questions raised by parties more or less involved and by observers, spectators, and scientists are among the most important and most disputed topics of the time during and after the world wars and the cold war until present days. The literary work of Münir Ertekün is distinguished by the objective and sober, unexcited style of a person so deeply involved in one of the greatest political and emotional conflicts of our time. It is therefore more than fitting that Münir Ertekün was awarded an honorary doctorate by the 9 Eylul University of Izmir in 1989.|
|25||As a result of the enormous efforts to which he had so amply contributed ever since his return to Cyprus in 1953, N.M. Münir saw the day in 1974, when his people won liberty and factual self-government. But until the end of his days, he was not rewarded with the experience of his Turkish Cypriot people receiving equal treatment under the law of nations including the recognition of their human right of self-government in safety.|
|26||The material reward received for his toil by Münir Ertekün during his lifetime, was, partially due to the peculiar situation of the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, not ample. The reward for his immaculate personality and personal life, however, came to him in the sphere of true, faithful and loyal relatives and friends. My wife and I consider it a great privilege to count ourselves among these. For us like for many who met him and learned from him, Münir Ertekün was not only an important teacher of law and justice and diplomacy but first of all an unsuperable example of personal dedication, truthfulness and humanitarianism. His friendship was and remains a permanent treasure. Those who feel with us shall forever carry his memory in their hearts.|
(1) The particular Cyprus problem arose from co-habitation, under Turkish and British rule, of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in mixed towns and villages, both communities adhering to very different cultures, religions, civilizations and national feelings. When nationalistic ideals reached Cyprus in the beginning of the 19th century, they triggered Greek uprisings and obstructions against the Turkish and later the British government of the island, culminating in the fighting professionally prepared and initiated by the Greek terrorist organisation EOKA from 1954 onwards.
(2) The modern concept of the State in the meaning mentioned here with its particular reference to a defined territory was developed by Jean Bodin towards the end of the 16th century (vide McRae, K.D., ed., The six books of a commonweale, a facsimile reprint of the English translation of 1606, Cambridge 1962) but goes back to the teachings of Cicero and even Aristotle. Peace and common defense are mentioned as objectives of sovereignty by Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 177 of the edition by Plamenatz, Oxford, in the Fontana Library of 1962.
(3) A comprehensive overview of international law teaching concerning unrecognized states with particular regard to Cyprus has been given not so long ago after the climax of the Cyprus conflict by Stefan Talmon in his books Kollektive Nichtanerkennung illegaler Staaten (Collective Non-recognition of Illegal States), 2006, and Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile, 1998 (Oxford Monographs in International Law). While the author makes it clear that sovereignty is a matter of fact instead of recognition, international rights and duties of the sovereign body are still considered as limited owing to non-recognition.
(4) Vide Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive versus the Declaratory Doctrine of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?, British Year Book of International Law, 75 (2004), pp. 101-181. The widely held view that a State cannot legally be created or exist or its territory cannot change with the help of military intervention obviously contradicts not only the notion of legality, requiring a (lacking) law-making and enforcing authority surpassing the authority of States, but also international historical practice, as hardly any existing state has originally come into being or is able to survive without the use of force. Even if the view were valid, the theory would have to provide for an exception in cases where life, safety and liberty of a population cannot be permanently and basically protected otherwise. Cf. Stefan Talmon, The Duty Not to Recognize as Lawful a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation Without Real Substance?, in: Christian Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 99-126.
(5) Vide Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, London 1978, Chapters I-III, and Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959, Oxford 1998, Chapter 3.
(6) The Turkish Cypriot community was driven away from thirty-three mixed villages and the Turkish houses in these villages were immediately burnt down by the Greek Cypriots. The message was clear: Dont come back. We dont want you. Cyprus will be united with Greece. Those who dont want this must quit the island, quotation from Necati M. Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute, Lefkosa, 2nd edition 1984, p. 4. The pogroms of 1955 were not the first ones to force Turkish Cypriots into migration. Turkish minorities who had lived in overwhelmingly Greek populated villages had been compelled to concentrate by moving to Turkish villages even more than a century earlier in order to ensure their security against violent Greek nationalistic policy, vide Crawshaw, op.cit. Chapters IV and V; John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, Nicosia 1986, p. 56 et.seq. . For details of Greek Cypriot terrorism later reciprocated from the Turkish side vide Holland, op. cit., chapters 3 through 10. A research based on field studies by the Canadian scholar and former member of the UN-forces in Cyrus, Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971, Waterloo 1976, revealed that the number of mixed population centres had decreased from 346 in 1891 over 252 in 1931 to 114 in 1960, vide the chart p.12
(7) The history and wording of the Cyprus agreements of 19.2.1959 is laid out in all detail including all relevant documents and a bibliography by Ludwig Dischler in Die Zypernfrage, Frankfurt aM 1960. A brief outline of the substance of the treaties and constitution is given by Reddaway, op.cit (see the previous footnote) at p. 120 et seq.
(8) Münir was, inter alia, Legal Advisor to the Cyprus Turkish Delegation in the Joint Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot Constitutional Commission that finalized the draft of the Constitution that was to be put into effect in 1960; vide Cyprus, Presented to the British Parliament by Command of Her Majesty in July 1960 (Cmnd.1093) Annex XIII p. 173.
(9) Reports of Cases decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus (RSCC) published in English by authority of the Republic of Cyprus from 1961 until 1963.
(10) Administrative Law was prominent among the subject-matters taught by Ernst Forsthoff as a university professor, cf The Administrative Act, §§ 11-13 of his Textbook on Administrative Law, München, 8th edition 1961, translated into English by Christian Heinze, Nicosia 1963.
(11) Vide Reddaway, op. cit., Appendix II, p. 192-198, and Some Examples of Enosis Pronouncements Made by Greek Cypriot Leaders quoted in N.M.Ertekün, op. cit., p. 163 et seq.
(12) It is difficult not to compare the Greek Cyprus policy since 1953 and its results with the deceptions by which Greece surreptitiously obtained acceptance in the Euro-pool and with its subsequent fiscal behavior including their results.
(13) For the full text of the plan vide Reddaway, op.cit., Appendix III, and Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus, my deposition, Vol. 1, Nicosia, 1989, p.212 et seq. It is also reproduced in Ertekün, op. cit., p. 165 et seq. The steps planned under the Akritas code came to public notice in more detail through the publication of 13 points of Greek demands for changes of the constitution of 1960 announced by president Makarios in December 1963 and reproduced in Ertekün, op.cit., Appendix 6 p. 182. Further steps to realize the plan were made by the Greek part of the former Cypriot parliament passing laws in 1964 and by the Greek organs implementing them, which are quoted in detail in an appendix to this article. (This appendix had been part of my paper On the question of the compatibility of the admission of Cyprus into the European Union with international law, the law of the EU and the Cyprus Treaties of 1959/60, published in: Ertekün (Ed.), The Status of the two peoples in Cyprus, Legal Opinions, 2nd edition, 1997, p. 181 et seq. This paper was circulated in the General Assembly of the United Nations as an Annex to document A/52/404 S/1997/757 of 29th September, 1997, but the list of Greek actions and acts that were inconsistent with the constitution of 1960 was ominously omitted in the course of the circulation).
(14) Supplementary provisions to ensure the operability of that Article are contained in its sections 2 and 3 and in Art. 174 through 178 of the constitution.
(15) RSCC (footnote 9), Vol. 5, Case No. 10/63, p. 59-78 , with a dissenting opinion read by J. Triantafyllides, p. 79-101.
(16) Cf. RSCC Vol. 5, p. 109-112.
(17) The idea of legality of the creation of a state does not and cannot refer to any laws covering such a creation (according to which its legality or illegality could be established), because no such laws exist and no authority exists that would be entitled to make such laws. Without the sincere and lasting consent of the relevant people in the basic political conditions of its existence and without a superior (sovereign) power to uphold these conditions a state cannot be formed. Also, sovereignty, which is not a right like ownership but requires effective supreme control of a defined territory, cannot be ceded or transferred. This is why, in the words of Robert Holland and Sir Hugh Foot, although Cyprus was about to become an independent Republic, it was a form of independence without a real state, and what really happened can be summed up, as Hugh Foot did, under the headline from Colonial rule to Agreement rule. Holland observes op. cit p. 331 quite correctly that, when the agreement effectively collapsed in the beginning of 1964, there was no state machinery in being to pick up the pieces, except in a very partial and divisive manner.
(18) The illegality of revolutions does not prevent the coming into existence, by means of a revolution, of new States with all rights and duties of a State under international law, if and insofar as the sovereignty of the new State is permanently and effectively established and minimum requirements of legitimacy of the new state are fulfilled. Its existence does not depend on recognition, the legal meaning of which is of a declaratory nature only. The territory of a new State created by revolution does not, however, extend further than its effective sovereignty. Therefore, the present existence in international law of a Greek State of Southern Cyprus cannot be denied, but its territory does not extend to that of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC).
(19) In 109 villages, most of them Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs, a quotation from Necati M. Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute, Lefkosa, 2nd edition 1984, p. 16 footnote 6, referring to the report by the Secretary General to the Security Council of the United Nations Organization No. S/5950 of 10.9.64 (such reports are referred to hereafter as UN reports) and the Ortega report of the UN published in the same book as Appendix 12. According to Patrick, p. 46, 47, and 358 of his book quoted in footnote 6, questioning official sources of information given on p. 371, deems it more prudent to accept that, between 21.12.1963 and 10.8.1964, app. 350 Turkish Cypriots and 200 Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks were killed in the course of intercommunal fighting. For the period between 11.8.1964 and 15.11.1967 Patrick believes that app. 72 Turkish Cypriots have been killed by Greek Cypriots whereas 15 Greek Cypriots have been killed by Turkish Cypriots (p. 119 and 120).
(20) According to M. Ertekün, op.cit, p. 15,22,23, it was documented in a report given by Minister Andreas Papandreou of mainland Greece, that 20,000 fully armed officers and men from mainland Greece were secretly brought to Cyprus under an agreement of April 1964 between the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and Makarios. This resulted in Cyprus being virtually under the occupation of Greece. It was with the help of this occupation that the Greek State of south Cyprus was able to consolidate itself from 1964 onwards. This consolidation culminated in the attack in September 1967 of 20,000 Greek fighters on Kophinou (Gecitkale) and Ayios Theodoros (Bogazici) about half way between Larnaca and Limassol - under the Command of Grivas. According to Patrick, op. cit. p.126, app. 12,000 Greek Army personnel and 16,000 Greek Cypriot National Guard conscripts were facing 5,000 Turkish fighters in Cyprus (a United Nations estimate arrives at a number of Turkish fighters of more than 12,000, vide Patrick p. 69)
(21) Vide Patrick, op.cit. p.75 et seq. and 340-345. The field research conducted by Patrick indicates that of 233 previous Turkish centers, 98 stood abandoned by 10 August, 1964; vide op.cit. p. 80. Maps of Turkish controlled territories are given pp. 81, 279 and 347.
(22) Vide Patrick, op. cit. p. 106-113. A list of items that were forbidden by the Greek authorities in Cyprus with effect of 1st March 1965 is given by Ertekün at p.189, 190 of his book quoted in footnote 6. This list includes bags and boots of all kinds, rubber soles, automobile spare parts and tires, gloves, socks and all woolen materials as well as thermos flasks and plastic pipes. Another list of July, 1964, included even certain articles of clothing, building materials, cement, electrical equipment, batteries, timber, and chemicals; vide Patrick, op. cit. p. 107 and 137.
(23) Vide Ertekün. Op-cit. p. 184 et seq., referring to several UN-reports and particularly to that of 10 September, 1964 (S/5950) stating The economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances has been so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicated that the Government of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action.
(24) When on 22nd July, 1965, the Turkish Cypriots who had been elected as members of the Parliament of Cyprus under the Constitution of 1960 demanded access to the meetings held under the title of such a parliament, the Greek president of what was supposed to constitute that Parliament, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, made the access conditional on the Turkish Cypriot members agreeing to the validity of laws made by the Parliament, some of which were inconsistent with the Constitution of 1960, and that the procedure of separate majorities designed to safeguard effective Turkish participation in the making of certain laws had been abolished contrary to Art. 78 of the Constitution; vide the UN report of 29th July, 1965, No. S/6569. As they did not accept these conditions, the Turkish members were prevented from exercising their constitutional function.
(25) Vide Ertekün, op. cit. p.186 referring to the UN report of 10 June, 1966, S/7350, and the remark made by Triantafyllides, then a judge in the (Greek-Cypriot) Supreme Court, quoted in Clerides, op. cit., Vol. 3 p.233.
(26) For a detailed overview of the formal introduction of a new constitution for a new Greek state of Cyprus in contradiction with basic provisions of the Constitution of 1960 vide the Appendix to this article.
(27) The lack of early international information is reflected in the Johnson-letter of 1964 quoted in footnote 29 promising regard for the interests of the Turkish Cypriots and hinting that there had not been sufficient time to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.
(28) Cf. Article IV sec. 2 of that Treaty which reads In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty. It would be cynical to interpret that state of affairs as the state that was really created. The Article refers to the state of affairs that was agreed to be created.
(29) On the 5th June, 1964, U.S. President Johnson, in a letter to the President of Turkey, advised that Turkish military intervention in Cyprus was contrary to the Treaty of guarantee of 1960 excluding partition of the island. He made a point that your NATO allies had not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention. This refers to the Soviet Union having previously assured Greek-Cypriot emissaries of its support (vide Patrick, op.cit. in footnote 6, p. 62). The letter also refers to Art. IV of the U.S.-Turkish treaty of 1947, where Turkey is required to obtain U.S. consent for the use of U.S. military assistance and that the U.S. cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. The letter assures Turkey of the U.S. having no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. The full text of the letter is quoted in Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus, my deposition, Vol. 2, Nicosia, 1989, p.115-118. To add point to the letter, the Sixth [U.S.] fleet was discreetly placed between Turkey and Cyprus, H.D. Purcell, Cyprus, London, 1969, p. 346. It is true, however, that in 1964 Turkey had neither the shipment nor adequate planning for a military intervention in Cyprus.
(30) According to the wording of Art. IV sec. 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey and Britain have reserved a right to take action, but this right includes an obligation arising from the assumption of a legal power of participating by treaty in the establishment of a new state. As concerns Britain, it does not appear compatible with its responsibility for peace that a State gives up its sovereignty over a population and territory without taking effective measures to exclude civil war.
(31) A most broadly researched Article by Stefan Talmon shows that the erroneous denial of the legitimacy of a State to TRNC constitutes the legal basis of the problem of direct flights to Ercan airport, which constitutes the most important issue of the embargo; vide Luftverkehr mit nicht anerkannten Staaten: Der Fall Nordzypern [Air Traffic with Non-Recognized States: The Case of Northern Cyprus], Archiv des Völkerrechts [Public International Law Archive], 43 (2005), pp. 1-42. An English translation of this article was commissioned by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office for submission in legal proceedings. While this article is being written, a relevant case is pending before the British High Court.
(32) Vide the text referring to footnote 25.
(33) Clement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio, Huntington, 1998, p.27.
(34) Particularly the Greek Cypriots were delivered from their obligation to tolerate co-determination of Turkish Cypriots, which they so strongly opposed since nationalism began (cf the popular Greek description of Turkish Cypriots as permanent guests in Cyprus). At the same time, they were also delivered, with the help of the Turkish army, from the predominance of powers and forces from mainland Greece that had, in the words of Archbishop Makarios, invaded Cyprus and sought control over his government shortly before the Turkish military action.
(35) Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (2003); Official Journal L 236 of 23 September 2003.
(36) A detailed description of the Turkish-Cypriot administration and its organization is given by Patrick, opp. Cit. pp.82-88.
(37) The Turkish Cypriots agreed on a constitution for that state on 8th June, 1975; vide Ertekün, op. cit. p. 34.
(38) Vide Ertekün, op. cit. chapters V through XVII.
(39) Vide Ertekün, op. Cit., p. 248, 267, 278, 360.
(40) Vide my paper The Annan Plan for Cyprus, An Examination of its Basic Meaning and Some of ist Provisions, and Suggestions for an Alternative, prepared for the government of TRNC on 21st December, 2003.
(41) Upon the appeal of former Greek Cypriot owners of a plot of land in the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, a Greek Cypriot Court of Justice had sentenced the English couple by the name of Orams to remove the buildings they had added, by authority of titles under Turkish Cypriot legislation, to that property, and to pay damages for their use of it. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), presided by a judge on whom the President of the Greek Cypriot contesting party had conferred, in 2006, the Makarios III Grand Cross, ruled in a judgment of 28th April, 2009 (case-No. C-420/07), and the British Court of Appeal in a judgment of 19th January, 2010 (case No. A2/2006/2114) that the initial Greek Cypriot judgment must be executed in England under European Community law. While the British Court of Appeal, dealing with the admissibility of this outcome under British law, went into details finding that no appearance of bias concerning the President of the ECJ had arisen, it did not deal with any question concerning the existence or legality of a Republic ruled exclusively by Greek Cypriots and vested with sovereignty over the territory of TRNC. It relied solely, in this respect, on the policy of recognition and non-recognition adopted by the British government and by United Nations organs, without even discussing the (not) binding nature of relevant resolutions of the latter. Neither has the Court of Appeal endeavored to refute convincingly the view held by Justice Jack in a previous judgment of the British High Court that had relied on the reservation made in the Treaty of accession of Cyprus to the EU to the effect that the acquis communautaire does not extend to the territory of TRNC.
(42) Applications No. 46113/99 by Takis Demopoulos and seven others.
(43) Op. cit. in footnote 6.