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Christian Heinze

Der Zypernkonflikt ist ein Beispiel für fatale Störungen inneren und internationalen Friedens durch Täuschung und Selbsttäuschung, auch von Staaten und Staatengemeinschaften, über Souveränität und Homogenität als Bedingungen für Staatlichkeit, und durch Mängel an Wahrhaftigkeit und Verbindlichkeit von Verträgen
The Cyprus Confict is an example for fatal disturbances of internal and international peace through deception and self deception, by states and unions of states as well, about sovereignty and homogeneity constituting requirements for statehood, and through defects of truth and binding validity of contracts

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Chr. Heinze: Verzeichnis aller pages / Index to all pages
Gesucht: Jurist(in), Politologe(Politologin) oder Historiker(in)
Looked for: Jurist, Political Scientist or Historian

The Cyprus Conflict - The United Nations at Fault
Der Zypernkonflikt - Ein Fehler der Vereinten Nationen

Eine subpage zur Seite: / A Subpage to the Page: * 2012 05 22 / 2016 03 17 / Bilder eingefügt 2016 07 22

Zypernkonflikt Aktuell * Cyprus Conflict up to Date

October 2016 - another "deadline" for Cyprus Fahne en

"Gemeinsame Erklärung" vom 11.2.2014 mit Anmerkungen
The "Joint Declaration" of 2014-02-11 - annotated
Fahne en

International Crisis Group Fahne
Tabu-Durchbruch: Würdigung der Türkisch-Zyprischen Republik (nur in englischer Sprache)
Breakthrough: Appreciation of the Turkish Cypriot Republic
Fahne en

The Present Position of the United Nations Organization in the Cyprus Conflict (April 2015) Fahne en

Wikipedia Distorts the Nature and Importance of the Cyprus Conflict (2015 10 14). Fahne en

Anmerkungen zum Zypernkonflikt / Spots on the Cyprus Conflict Fahne en

A letter to the editor of the Financial Times of March 16, 2016 Fahne en


the article on Cyprus written by Peter Spiegel and published in the "Financial Times" of March 15, 2016, calls for a reply.

Whoever bases ideas about the Cyprus conflict on a story of the island having been devided by the Turkish invasion of 1974, helps preventing the only solution promising permanent peace, which is recognition of two sovereign States of Cyprus. This is the only promising solution because of the claim for sovereignty over Cyprus including its Turkish inhabitants strictly pursued by the Greek party since the 1950ies until this day with utmost stringency and without the slightest consideration for the even vital interests of the Turkish Cypriots. It also offers the only chance of uniting the conflicting Greek and Turkish Cypriots in some sort of a federation, based on their equality and true mutual interests.

The Greek claim for ruling the Turks of Cyprus has no basis in history or reality. It is founded on nothing but the greater number of Greeks in the island and - if not expressly so - on their purported cultural, economic, and religious superiority. The majority arguments would entitle Turkey to claim the whole of Cyprus for itself because the number of Turks in the eastern mediterranean area including the islands close to its shores exceeds that of Greeks. And a claim of cultural, economic or religious superiority does not constitute sovereignty but is bound to produce civil or even international war. The Greek attitude has created and maintains the Cyprus conflict since it arose in the context of the nationalist movement of the 19th century. It reached a peak in Greek atrocities against Turkish Cypriots in the 1950ies together with the burning down of many of their villages in the island. This attitude was confirmed publicly by their Archbishop Makarios at the same time when he and the Greek leadership signed, and purported to agree with, a Cyprus constitution of 1960. This constitution was designed to establish a state of Cyprus (which had never existed before) on condition of sepcific political rights being granted to the Turkish Cypriots. While this constitution was guaranteed in an international treaty with Great Britain as one of the guarantor states, the Greek leadership believed that the West (including Britain) would allow them to get rid of the Turkish rights soon. This belief did not fail. When the Greek Cypriot signatories to the constitution did away with the Turkish rights at gunpoint in 1963/1964 (thus proving the republic of 1960 a failed state and a fraud, at best as a self-deception) and tried to break any resistance by fordce of arms, the United Nations Organization came to the aid of the Greek usurpers. The UN not only recognized an exclusively Greek republic of Cyprus but also its title to sovereignty over the Turks of the island, ignoring the Greek breach of the constitution of 1960. The poorly equipped Turkish minority had, however, bravely and successfully resisted Greek strife for sovereignty in parts of the island for ten years, suffering great hardships afflicted on them by Greek arms and by means of a Greek embargo, when, in 1974, a Greek military force tried to establish that sovereignty once and for all by invading the island. At this stage, Turkey as one of the guarantor states mentioned came to the help of the Turkish Cypriots, who were now able to finalize the creation of their own republic in the North of the island.

In view of the continued Greek usurpatory demand, the position thus created would constitute the solution of the conflict, were it not for continued international discrimination and an international embargo entertained against the Turkish republic of Cyprus. It is the position maintained by the UN (and by Britain and by the EU) that practically obliges the Greek conflicting party to continue their policy aimed at subjugating the Turks of Cyprus. Looking at the complete story of the conflict, it is most likely that the Turks of Cyprus and Turkey will never accept Greek superiority over Cyprus permanently. Even if Greek sovereignty were forced upon the Turkish side and even if it would be limited by another international agreement, there is no hope that the Greek conflicting party would not again use all its efforts and cunning to get rid of such limitations. On the other hand, the Greek conflicting party, should it lose the support of the United Nations or even of the EU or Britain, will most likely, in its own interest, give up its resistance against the establishment of the Turkish state of Cyprus, be it in return for some concessions to be made by the Turkish side. Therefore, the story criticised here is bound to prolong the conflict indefinitely and to lead to a return of strife and bloodshed in the island which is presently prevented through the presence of Turkish troops. Moreover, a resurgence of strife in Cyprus would endanger any peace that may be created in the eastern mediterranean area in the future.

Sincerely Christian Heinze"

Zypern - der Konflikt und seine Lösung in Kürze
* 10.1.2015 *
Cyprus - the Conflict and its Solution in a Nutshell

G   Mak   Mak   Mak   Tk

Landkarte Griechenland by GinkgoMaps CC BY           (c) Orlando Fernandez                               (c)                     (c) Türkische Republik von Nordzypern          Landkarte Türkei by GinkgoMaps CC BY                                        

in deutscher und englischer Sprache Fahne de
in German and English language
Fahne en

"Herrschaft der Mehrheit bedeutet Krieg" (1964) * "Majority Rule means War" (1964) Fahne en

"Der Zypern-Konflikt, eine Bewährungsprobe westlicher Friedensordnung"(1964) * "The Cyprus Conflict, the Western Peace System is put to the Test"(1964) Fahne en

Griechische Zypernpropaganda: Ein Aufsatz von Professor Johannes Papalekas und eine verhinderte Erwiderung (1980-1983) - von höchst aktueller Bedeutung nicht nur für den gesamten Verlauf des Zypernkonflikts sondern auch für den Höhepunkt der griechischen Überschuldungskrise von 2015.
An article by Professor Johannes Papalekas and a prevented response (in German language only).

Typische Fehldarstellungen des Zypernkonflikts * 2006
Typical Distortions in Describing the Cyprus Conflict
(in German Language only)

Zypernkonflikt - Überblick 2007 * Cyprus Conflict - Overview 2007

Ein kompetenter Brief an das deutsche Außenministerium * 2010 * A Competent Letter to the German Foreign Office
(in German Language only)

Zwei Jahrestage im Zypernkonflikt - Zweistaatenlösung überfällig * 2013 11 01 * Two Anniversaries within the Cyprus Conflict - Two-States-Solution overdue Fahne en

EU rasselt ohne Säbel im östlichen Mittelmeer. * 2014 11 16 * EU Rattles without Sabre in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea
(In German Language only)

Assoziierung der deutschen Regierung mit einer Desinformation durch die Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung zum Zypernkonflikt. * 2014 12 20
Association of the German Government with a Misleading Information on the Cyprus Conflict by the Federal Agency for Political Education
(in German Language only)

Grundlegende Literatur zum Zypernkonflikt
Basic Literature on the Cyprus Conflict

Alle Beiträge des Verfassers dieser homepage zum Thema Zypernkonflikt, zum Teil verlinkt mit dem vollen Wortlaut.
All contributions by the author of this homepage on the Cyprus Conflict, in part linked with their full wording.

Off-Net seit / Off Net since Archiv Archive
2016 03 17

2015 10 14

Erinnerung an eine nicht nur mit Bezug auf den Zypern-Konflikt sondern auch mit Bezug auf die griechische Überschuldungskrise von 2015
nach wie vor höchst aktuelle Kontroverse von 1980-1983 um griechische Politpropaganda
Greek Cypriot President authenticates Reason for Permanence of the Cyprus Conflict (2015 09 30).

Greek Cyprus - the Russian Relation (2015 02 28).

Remarks on a Statement by the US Ambassador(2015 02 27). Fahne

Mustafa Akinci new President of TRNC (May 2015)Fahne

Three Steps towards Ending the Cyprus Conflict Fahne
Short Statement for "Cyprus Scene" of 19th November, 2014.

Truth- and Peace-oriented Greek voices:
George Koumoullis in Cyprus Mail, April 2015 (an excerpt) Fahne
Loucas Charalambous in Cyprus Mail, June 2014 Fahne


Verzeichnis aller pages von Christian Heinze / Index to all pages by Christian Heinze